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Appendix 1
Imputation both of Christ’s Active and Passive
Obedience Necessary
Mr.
John Goodwin in his Treatise of justification part 2, ch.
2, lays down several conclusions, whereby he might
overturn this truth: and what he says must be examined.
His
first conclusion is this. He, for whose sins a plenary satisfaction hath
been made (either by himself, or another for him) and hath been accepted by
him, against whom the transgression was committed, is as just and righteous, as
he that never sinned, but had done all things, that were requisite and meet for
him to do. Answer: If by just and righteous be meant one who only
hath not deserved the punishment threatened; then his conclusion is true: but
if by just and righteous be meant one who hath not only hath not
deserved the punishment, but hath also deserved the reward promised; then his
conclusion is false; for the satisfaction, if it respect only the transgression
committed, can only put the man, for whom it is given and accepted, in the
state of one, that is under no obligation to be punished: but it cannot put him
in the state of one, who not only is not to be punished, but is also to be
rewarded. He adds, This is evident; because
there is as much justice and righteousness in repairing the wrongs and injuries
done to any, as there is in abstaining from doing wrong. Answer: True, in
reference to the wrong done; and therefore such a one is rightly and justly
delivered from the obligation to punishment; but is not made so righteous, as
to challenge the reward, till a more complete satisfaction be made, to wit,
such as may comprehend also perfect conformity unto the law in all points, to
the end, he, for whom this is done, may be looked upon as a fulfiller of the
law,
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he would have had, if he had in his own person perfectly
kept it. He that simply repairs the wrong done does not that which deserves the
reward. The simile he annexes confirms this, and demonstrates how far out he
is, as to our case. He that by his cattle, or otherwise, hath made spoil in
his neighbor’s corn, and hath given him full satisfaction for the spoil done,
to his contentment, is as good a neighbor, and deals as justly and honestly
with him, as he that never trespassed in that kind upon him. How
impertinent this is, as to our case, any may see; or he must say that there was
no reward promised to Adam, upon his perfect obedience; and that the words, do this and live, had no place in the Covenant
made with him. The satisfying neighbor deserves no reward, nor was there any
reward promised to him, upon condition of his being a good neighbor. He adds,
The essence and nature of justice or righteousness is suum cuique tribuere, to give to every man his own,
i.e. that which is his own in a way of equity and right, is due from us unto
them. Answer: But that which Adam was obliged to give to God, as his own,
was glory, by faithful and constant obedience, that he might receive the reward
to the glory of God’s faithfulness and goodness. Now when Adam dishonored the
Lord by disobedience, and robbed him (as it were) of his authority, as just and
righteous Governor, a satisfaction for the wrong done, excluding positive and
full obedience unto the law, is not giving to God all that is due to him. Now
(says he) when we have injured or damnified
any man, in any of his rights, or things belonging to him, there is nothing
more due to him, than that which is his own, i.e. that which is fully valuable
to the injury we have done unto him. Therefore he that tenders a valuable
consideration or satisfaction for an injury done to another, is just, according
to the height and utmost exigency of justice; and consequently as just, as he
that never was injurious or did wrong. Answer: All of this is to no purpose, as to
our question; for it is not betwixt God and us: nor was it betwixt God and
Adam, as it is betwixt one man and another. God is to be considered as a
Supreme Law-Giver and Ruler, enjoining obedience to his laws, under penalties,
and promising rewards unto obedience: Now when his laws are broken, he is
doubly injured, and the breaker is obliged unto punishment, and also forfeits
his expectation of the reward. When satisfaction is made, and withal no
complete obedience to the law, the person is by the satisfaction made, only
exempt from the obligation to punishment, but hath thereby no right to the
reward promised, until the Law be completely obeyed.
His
second conclusion is this: There is no medium between a perfect absolution
and freedom from all sin; and a perfect and complete righteousness: but he that
is fully discharged and freed from sin, ipso facto, is
made perfectly and completely righteous. Answer: The same distinction,
which we made use of in the other conclusion, will help us here. If by perfectly
and completely righteous be meant one that is liable to no punishment, it
is true, that he who is fully discharged and freed from sin, is made perfectly
righteous, but if by perfectly and completely righteous be meant one
that moreover hath a right to the recompense of reward that is promised, then
it is false: freedom and absolution from sin respects only guilt, and dissolves
the obligation to punishment, and in
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that respect, is a perfect and complete righteousness;
i.e. the person, so absolved, is as free of punishment, or of obligation
thereunto, as if he had never sinned; but having sinned, he cannot by this
dissolution of the obligation to punishment be ipso facto made as
perfectly and completely righteous, as he would have been, if he had never
transgressed, but had perfectly kept the Law; for if he had perfectly kept the
law, he had obtained full right to the reward, which now he hath not, and which
no pardon, or discharge, as such, can restore him unto. Let us hear his reason.
Nothing (says he) can any way diminish, or prejudice the perfection
of righteousness, but only sin, as nothing can hinder the perfection of light,
but darkness in one degree or another. So that as the air, when it is free from
all degrees of darkness, must of necessity be fully light; so he that is
perfectly freed from all sin, must of necessity be fully and perfectly
righteous. Answer: This would make us believe, that he is here speaking of
sin itself, and not of its guilt and demerit, and so the opposite hereunto must
be holiness; which expels sin (in a manner) as light doth darkness, or as one
quality doth its contrary. But then he is fighting, all this while, against his
own shadow, for we are speaking of the guilt of sin, which also must be properly
understood, (and nothing else can) when he spoke of absolution and freedom
from sin, in the conclusion. If he speaks here of sin in respect of guilt
and demerit, his simile doth not quadrate; and opposite to this guilt he should
set righteousness or obedience with its merit: and if any will do this, they
shall easily see the mistake, for though a man hath not transgressed, yet he
hath not eo ipso right to the premium,
for in order to this, more days work may be required than one or half of one
day’s work; far less can the pardon of or satisfaction for this transgression,
give a man right to the reward.
He
adds, It is impossible to conceive a man
defective in any part of righteousness, and yet withal to conceive him free
from all sin: sin and righteousness being in subjecto
capaci, contraria
immediate, as Logicians speak. Answer: Defective in
Righteousness may be either understood in respect of the mere duty or
command, or in respect of full right to the reward. In the first sense, such a
one cannot be free of all sin; but taking it in the second sense, he may: as
for example, when one is to work eight days in dressing a garden, and then to
receive the reward promised, and if he fail in his work any of the days, to be
punished; this man, so long as he works 2, 3, 4, or 5 days, cannot be charged
with sin, nor said to be defective as to his duty; and yet he hath not full
right to the reward until he hath wrought eight days, but is defective in some
part of his righteousness, as to this reward. And according to this may we
understand that logical axiom.
Further
he says, The Scriptures themselves still make an immediate
opposition, between sin and righteousness. To find out a third estate between
sin and righteousness, we must find out a third Adam, from whom it should be
derived. Answer: The state of sin and of righteousness, whereof the
Scriptures speak, indeed admit of no medium, or third betwixt them, and the
reason is because, we are all now born in a state of sin, and are obnoxious to
wrath; and remain so, until we be translated into a state of righteousness,
which is not
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by mere pardon of sins, but also by the imputation of
a righteousness; for being in this state of righteousness, we have not only the
obligation to wrath and eternal punishment removed, which is done by remission
upon the account of the satisfaction of Christ imputed; but we have also a
right to the reward, the crown of life, which is had by imputation of
righteousness, or of obedience, though it were better to say, we have both by
both; or we have both by the imputation of that complete satisfaction and
merit, which comprehends, or consists of both.
His
third conclusion is this: Adam, while his innocence stood within him, and
till his fall by sin, was completely righteous, and in an estate of
justification before God: Yea, for the truth and substance of righteousness, as
righteous, as he could or should have been, if he had lived to this day, in the
most entire and absolute obedience to the law. Answer: Adam, while he
remained innocent, was completely righteous, that is, was chargeable with no transgression, it is true: that he
was completely righteous, that is, had full right to the reward, as having done
all his duty, and completed his work, it is most false. Therefore (2.) it is
false to say, he was in a state of justification, unless nothing else be hereby
meant, than that he was not in a state of condemnation. Though there be no mid
betwixt these two now, as to us, but either we must be in a state of
justification, or in a state of condemnation; Yet Adam while he stood, was
neither; Not in a state of condemnation; because he had not yet transgressed
the law; nor yet in a state of justification, because he had not yet done all
his duty; for he was to persevere in obedience to the end: and if he had been
justified, he had full right to the reward, and so had been glorified, for whom
the Lord justifies, he glorifies: But Adam was not glorified upon his law
obedience, and consequently was not justified by his Law-Obedience. (3.) The
truth and substance of righteousness (unto which he would restrict all) is not
the thing enquired after, nor is it at all to the point; for upon Adam’s having
of that simply, he could not expect the reward of life that was promised,
because the covenant he was under required continuance and perseverance in all
the several duties, called for by the Law, even to the end, ere he could
challenge a right to the reward: And further, Adam had this truth and substance
of righteousness at the first, and it was concreated with him; yet he could
not, upon that account have challenged glory, as his due.
He
adds, Even as the second Adam was as completely and perfectly righteous from
the womb, and so from his first entrance upon his public ministry, as he was at
last, when he suffered death. Answer: If we speak of our Lord Jesus, as the
second Adam, that is, as standing in the room of sinners, as the head and
public person, engaging in their behalf, whom he did represent, to pay all
their debt; though he knew no sin, and upon that account was perfectly
righteous, and separate from sinners; yet he was to finish the work laid upon
him, and to perform the whole debt, both of duty and suffering, which he had
undertaken; and till the last penny of that debt was paid, his work was not
finished, and until his work was finished, he could not challenge his reward:
and so this confirms what we have said of the first Adam.
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To
say (he adds) that Adam was not perfectly righteous, and consequently in
a justified estate or condition before God, until his fall by sin, is to place
him into an estate of condemnation before his sin, there being no middle or
third estate betwixt these two. Answer: This was obviated before. Adam’s
state before his fall was a state of innocence, wherein he enjoyed the favor
and presence of God, he being perfectly righteous, in reference to that state;
and to what was required of him; but justified he was not; for the reward was
not adjudged unto him. So that, as to him, there was a middle state betwixt a
state of justification and a state of condemnation; though as to us, there is
not, as the places which he cites afterward namely Romans 5: 18, 8: 1, 2 show, and the whole Scriptures evince.
He
closes this matter thus: Therefore to grant, that forgiveness of sins puts a
man into the same estate and condition, wherein Adam stood before his fall
(which is generally granted by men of opposite judgment in this controversy;
and nothing granted neither in this, but the unquestionable truth) is to grant
the point in question, and to acknowledge the truth labored for, throughout
this whole discourse. Answer: It is not granted that remission of sins, as
such, puts a man every way into the same condition, wherein Adam stood before
his fall; for it puts not a man in the same estate of inherent holiness,
wherein Adam was; but it puts the man into the same estate of freedom from any
obligation to punishment, for it takes away the reatus poenae, so that a
pardoned man, as such, is no more under the actual obligation unto the curse
and wrath of God, threatened for transgression, than Adam was before he fell:
and this is all that is confessed. Which is far, yea very far from granting the
point that he goes about to establish: for he would have remission, as such,
put as man in the state of full right to the reward, to the end he might
exclude the imputation of the obedience or righteousness of Christ as being
necessary unto this end, contrary to the truth of Scripture. Adam, before he
fell, had not right unto the promised reward, because he was to finish his
course of obedience, before he could obtain that: and therefore the granting,
that remission puts a man into the same condition, wherein Adam stood, will
contribute nothing to his end.
His
fourth conclusion is that perfect remission of sins includes the imputation
or acknowledgment of the observation of the whole law; even as the imputation
of the law fulfilled, necessarily includes the non imputation of sin, or the
forgiveness of all sin, in case any hath been committed. Answer: The
conclusion is manifestly false, if we speak of remission simply, and abstractly
as such; and the ground here alleged for it is ambiguous; for the imputation of
the Law fulfilled, may either be to such as never broke it, and then it doth
not include remission, but takes away all necessity of it; or to transgressors,
and then indeed it may presuppose remission, but doth not include it, as such.
But to remove ambiguities, we shall distinguish, and say that perfect remission
of sins includes the acknowledgment of the observation of the whole law, in
respect of punishment; but not in respect of the reward; that is, perfect
remission of sins exempts a man from punishment, as well as if he had perfectly
kept the law; but does not give him right to the reward;
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for unto this was requisite the perfect observation of
the law: Now perfect observation of the law says there was no transgression;
but remission says, and supposes, that the law was not perfectly observed. So
the imputation of the law fulfilled either says, the Law was not broken, or
that now satisfaction is made for the breach thereof, and therefore the person,
unto whom this imputation is made, hath a right unto the reward, which this imputation doth directly and immediately
respect, as such. But in our case, both of these go together, perfect
remission, and the imputation of the law fulfilled, because freedom from the
obligation to punishment, and right to the reward, go also together
inseparably.
For
how can he be said (says he) to have all his sins fully forgiven, who is
yet looked upon, or intended to be dealt with all, as one that hath
transgressed either by way of omission, or commission, any part of the Law? Answer:
He that hath his sins fully forgiven, may be well looked upon, as one that hath
transgressed, either by omission, or by commission, or by both; because he must
be so looked upon: for pardon presupposes sin; no man can be pardoned, but a
sinner, and no man can think or dream of a remission, but withal he must
suppose, that the person pardoned hath sinned. But it is true, he who is said
to have all his sins fully forgiven, cannot be intended to be dealt withal, as
one that hath transgressed: for pardon destroys that obligation to punishment,
but doth not so destroy sin, as to cause that it never was; for that is
impossible. What more? And he that is looked upon as one, that never
transgressed any part of the Law, must needs be conceived or looked upon as one, that hath fulfilled or kept the law. Answer: This
is also true, taking this imputation of a perfect
fulfilling of the law, to be to one, who never broke the law by sin; but it is
not true, in our case, who are transgressors, all the imputation of
righteousness in the world cannot make us to have been no sinners.
Yet he
infers, So that besides that perfect remission of sins, which hath been
purchased by the blood of Christ, there is no need of (indeed no place for) the
imputation of any righteousness, performed by Christ unto the law. Answer:
This is but the same thing, which was said, and is manifestly false. Remission
regards only the punishment, or the obligation thereunto, and dissolves it,
but, as such gives no right to the reward, which was promised only to obedience
to the law.
But he
then tells us more properly, and with Scripture exactness (as he says) that that
act of God, whereby he remits and pardons sin, is interpretatively nothing
else, but an imputation of a perfect righteousness or of a fulfilling of the
law: compare Romans 4: 6 with verses 7 and 11. Answer: This is but the same
thing and needs no new answer; for it is denied, that the act of God, whereby
he pardons sin, considered in itself, and as such, is interpretatively an
imputation of perfect righteousness. But it is true, in our case, it
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may be called so interpretatively, in this respect, that
there is such an indissoluble connection betwixt the two, that the one infers
the other, necessitate consequentis.
And this is all that can be proved
from Romans 4: 6, 7, 11.
He
adds, Even as the act of the Physician, by which he recovers his patient from
his sickness, may, withal propriety of speech, be called that act, whereby he restores
him to his health. Answer: The Physician purging away the humors, the
causes of the distemper, is the cause of health, by being the causa removens prohibens; because ex
natura rei, health follows upon the
removal of that, which caused the distemper; but the connection of pardon and
of imputation of righteousness is not ex
natura rei, but ex libera Dei constitutione: connecting the causes of both together. His next
similitude of the sun, dispelling darkness, and filling the air with light, is
as little to the purpose; because here is a natural necessary consequence,
light necessarily expelling darkness; which is denied in our case. Hence there
is no ground for what he adds, when he says, In like manner, God doth not
heal sin, that is forgive sin, by one act, and restore the life of
righteousness, that is impute righteousness, by another act at all differing
from it, but in and by one and the same punctual and precise act he doth the
one and the other. For we are not here enquiring after the oneness or
diversity of God’s acts in a philosophical manner: God can do many things by
one physical act: but we are enquiring concerning the effects, whether they be
one precise thing, flowing from one moral cause; or so diverse, as to require
diverse moral causes, and grounds, or whether the one doth naturally and
essentially include the other, as being both but one thing.
His
following words would seem to speak to this, when he says, forgiveness of
sins, and imputation of righteousness are but two different names, expressions,
or considerations of one and the same thing –one and the same act of God is
sometimes called forgiveness of sins, and sometimes an imputing of
righteousness; and the forgiveness of sins is sometimes called an imputing of
righteousness, to show and signify that a man needs nothing to a complete
righteousness, or justification, but the forgiveness of his sins: And again the
imputing of righteousness is sometimes called the forgiveness of sins, to show
that God hath no other righteousness to confer upon a sinner, but that which
stands in forgiveness of sins. Answer: This is but gratis dictum;
nothing at all is proved: These two, pardon of sins and imputation of
righteousness, are two distinct parts of one complete favor, and blessing
granted of God, in order to one complete blessedness, consisting likewise in
two parts, to wit, in freedom from punishment, which was deserved, and in right
to the promised inheritance, which was lost: and because these two, both in the
cause, and in the effect, are inseparably conjoined by the Lord; therefore, the
mentioning of the one may and doth import and signify both, by a synecdoche:
And hence no man, with reason, can infer, that they are both one and the same
precise thing, flowing from one and the same precise cause, and import only
different names, expressions or considerations of one and the same thing,
Christ’s obedience to the law, and his suffering for sin, were not one and the
same thing under various considerations, or names, but distinct parts of one
complete Surety-Righteousness: no more can the effects, that flow therefrom, be
accounted one and the same
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thing, but two distinct parts of one complete effect: And
therefore the mentioning of the one, instead of the whole, proves no confusion,
or sameness, but rather an inseparableness, which is yielded.
He
moves an objection against himself § 5 thus. How can God be said to impute a
righteousness to a man, which never was, nor ever had a being, no righteousness
(at least of that kind, whereof we now speak) having ever been, but that
perfect obedience, which Christ performed to the Law? This indeed is a very
rational question; for our author talks much of an imputed righteousness, and
never doth, nor yet can tell us, what that is, that can deserve the name of a righteousness. Let us hear, what he answers. 1. Says he, There
is as express and complete a righteousness in the law,
as ever Christ himself performed. Answer: But what righteousness is or can
be in a law, but what is there, by way of prescription? And who doubts of the
perfection of this, that acknowledges the perfection of the law? This is
utterly impertinent to the purpose in hand, where the question is of a
righteousness consisting in conformity to the law, and which must be attributed
to man, to whom the law is given? And what if it be said (says he) that
God, in remission of sins, through Christ, from and out of the law, imputes to
every man, that believes, such a righteousness, as is proper to him? Answer:
To say this, is to speak plain non-sense: for what is that to furnish a man
with a righteousness out of the law? Can a man be
changed into a law, or can a man have any righteousness, prescribed by a law, but
by thoughts, words, and deeds, bearing a conformity to
the commands of the law? And how can mere pardon cause this transformation? Can
the pardon of murder, or any prohibited act, make that act conformed to the
law? Pardon thus should be a self destroyer; for an act, that is no
transgression of a law, can need no pardon: and thus pardon should make itself
no pardon. What he subjoins, hath been spoken to
elsewhere.
He
gives a second answer, saying, To say, God
cannot impute a righteousness, which never had a being, i.e. which never was
really and actually performed by any man, is to deny that he hath power to
forgive sins. Answer: This hath been, and is still, denied; it hath never
been, nor never shall be proved, that forgiveness of sins is the imputation of a righteousness. Though he adds from Romans 4: 6 and 3: 28,
&c. that it is the imputation of such a righteousness,
as consists not, nor is made up of any works performed to the law by any man,
which is but a righteousness, that never had a being. Answer: This is but a
plain perverting of the Scriptures, which speak only of works (in that
exclusion) done and performed by us, as the whole scope, and all the
circumstances of the passages, demonstrate to any man, who will not willingly
put out his own eyes: and it were a mere imposing upon the understandings of
the most ordinary reader, and a miserable misspending of time, to go about the
evincing of this, which is so obvious. But what desperate shifts will not a
wrong cause put men to use, who will not be Truth’s captives?
His
fifth conclusion comes here also to be considered. It is this: He that is
fully discharged from his sins, needs no other
righteousness, to give him right and title unto life. This is as false as
the rest; for the law is, do this and live: and pardon
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for transgressions is not the same as doing the law. What
is his reason? Death is the wages of sin, and of
sin only, being due to no creature in any other respect, nor upon any other
term whatsoever. But what then? Now he that is
free of death, and in no way obnoxious thereunto, cannot but be conceived to
have a right unto life, there being neither any middle condition between death
and life, wherein it is possible for a reasonable creature to subsist, nor
again any capacity of life, but by some right and title thereunto. Answer:
Though this be true, as to us now, that he who is not obnoxious unto death,
hath a right unto life; yet the consequence that he would draw from it is not
good: to wit, that that only, which takes away the obnoxiousness unto death,
gives also a right to life: because God hath inseparably joined these effects
together, as also their distinct causes together, and given them inseparably;
so that he who is pardoned hath also a right to life, not merely upon the
account, that he is pardoned, but because together with the imputation of the
satisfaction of Christ, whence flows pardon, he imputes also Christ’s
righteousness, upon which follows the right to life. And howbeit now, as to us,
there is no middle state betwixt these two; yet in Adam there was; for while he
stood, he was not obnoxious unto death; and yet he had not right unto life: but
was to work out and perfect his task, to that end. But he tells us, While Adam stood, he was already in possession and
fruition of life; else he could not be threatened with death. Answer: This
is not the life, whereof we are speaking; we are speaking of the life, promised
by that covenant, unto perfect obedience: But it seems,
that he joins with the Socinians in this, granting no life promised to Adam,
but a continuance of what he was already in possession of.
He
enquires, If he had not a right unto life by
his freedom from sin, but was to purchase this right, by an actual fulfilling
of the law, it would be known, what quantities of obedience to the law must
have been paid, before he had made this purchase; and how long he must have
obeyed and kept the law? Answer: There is no necessity of any exact
knowledge of these things; our main question doth not stand or fall with the
knowledge or ignorance of them. Yet, we may say (and that is sufficient) that
the law, or covenant, requiring perfect obedience, and perpetual, without the
least omission or commission, he must have paid all that obedience, which the
law required of him, to the day of his transmigration, or change to glory,
before the purchase had been made. He adds, for had he lived two years in
his integrity and uprightness, without the least touch of any transgression, he
would still have been a debtor of obedience to the law, upon the same terms,
that he was, at the beginning, and the least interruption or breach in the
course of his obedience, had even now been the forfeiture of that life he
enjoyed. Answer: How long Adam should have lived upon earth, before his
translation to glory, we know not; nor is it of use for us to enquire; it is
sufficient to know, that he was to finish his course, and to persevere in
obedience to the end, if he would not both forfeit the life he had, and the
expectation of the life of glory, which was promised upon his completing his
work of obedience.
He
adds, Notwithstanding, the Scriptures of the
New Testament seem to place
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the immediate right, or capacity, which believers have
to the kingdom of heaven and eternal glory, rather in the grace of adoption,
than in any righteousness whatsoever, even remission of sins itself not
excepted. Answer: I have spoken to
this elsewhere, and shall only say here, that thereby he hath destroyed his
conclusion; for hereby we see, that in order to the attaining of right to life,
more is requisite, than mere remission, for he cannot say, that remission of
sins and adoption, is all one, having clearly hinted the contrary here, and
having also denied righteousness to be the ground of adoption, while as before
he made righteousness and remission of sins all one. He shall never prove that
adoption is without the imputation of righteousness. Let us here his reason. The
reason whereof may (haply) be this,
because the life and blessedness, which come by Jesus Christ, are of far higher
nature, excellency and worth, than that which was covenanted to Adam, by way of
wages for his work. or obedience to the law, and therefore require a higher and
fuller and richer capacity, or title in the creature, to interesse him therein,
than that did: work faithfully performed is enough to entitle a man to his
wages, but the gift of an inheritance requires a special grace or favor.
Answer: As this is but dubiously asserted, so it is to no purpose; for though
some differences may be granted betwixt the glory, now had by the Gospel and
that promised to Adam. in several respects; yet it was
a life of glory, that was promised to Adam, and our adoption is not without the
imputation of a righteousness. Nor was Adam’s obedience such a work, as in
strict justice called for wages, without a covenant. The imputation of
righteousness is indeed a special grace and favor and therefore fit enough to
found adoption.
His
sixth conclusion is this: That satisfaction, which Christ made to the
justice of God for sin, and whereby he procured remission of sins (or perfect
righteousness) and reconciliation with God for those that believe, consists
only in that obedience of his, which he performed to that peculiar and special
law of Mediation, which God imposed upon him (which we commonly, though perhaps
not altogether so properly, call his passive obedience) and not at all in that
obedience or subjection, which he exhibited to that common law of nature, which
we call moral. Answer: Though, if we should speak strictly of satisfaction,
as distinguished from obedience, and as relating to the punishment of sin, the
substance of this conclusion might be granted; Yet taking satisfaction more
largely, as relative to our whole debt, it must necessarily include his
obedience to the law moral. (2.) Though for explication’s sake, we may speak of
Christ’s active, and of his passive obedience distinctly; yet there was
suffering and satisfaction, in all his active obedience (as it is commonly
called) and there was action and meriting in all his Passive obedience (as it
is commonly called.) His supposing remission of sins, and perfect
righteousness, is already discovered to be a mistake. (4.) The special law of
Mediation requires of Christ both obedience and suffering, and he speaks without
ground, when he restricts it to his passive obedience, (as it is commonly
called) only. His reason is, Because nothing
can be satisfactory to divine justice for sin, but that which is penal, Hebrews
9: 22, for doubtless, where there is satisfaction, there is and may be
remission. Answer: This confirms only what we granted of satisfaction taken
strictly. But cannot
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prove that satisfaction largely taken, may not, or cannot,
yea or must not, include obedience, this being part of our debt to the law, and
to the Lawgiver. Nor will it prove, that there was
nothing of satisfaction in Christ’s obedience, which he performed in his state
of humiliation. It is true, where there is satisfaction, there is and may be
remission; but remission is not all that we stand in need of. But he will have
that obedience, which Christ exhibited to the moral law, no way penal: and his
reason is, Because it was requisite of man,
in his innocency, and imposed by God upon Adam before his fall; yea and still
lies and shall lie to the days of eternity upon men and angels. Answer: Yet
for all this, it might be and was penal unto Christ, who was not mere man, but
God and man in one person: And for him, who was God, and above all law, that
man comes under, to subject himself to that law, which was imposed upon man, as
a Viator, must needs be penal, it being a part of his subjection, as made under
the law, and a piece of his humiliation, for thus, in part, he took upon him
the form of a servant, and was made in the likeness of men; and being found in
fashion, as a man, he humbled himself, and became obedient unto death, Philippians
2: 7, 8; Galatians 4: 4. What they do, who are in
glory, is not to the purpose; for here were are speaking of the obedience and
subjection of such, as are viators, and not Comprehensors. And
Adam while innocent, was a Viator; and Christ, to pay
that debt, which was required of us all, as Viators, did humble himself to
perform the obedience of a Viator, in our place, and in our stead, that so he
might give full satisfaction, and pay our whole debt.
From
hence, there is no ground for his inference, to wit, that Therefore man was
punished, and that by order and appointment of God, before his fall, and that
now the glorified saints and angels, yea and Jesus Christ himself, are now
punished in heaven. For (1.) it might be and was penal to him, who was God,
which was duty unto man in his innocency, as is cleared, and (2.) The obedience
of saints and angels, now in glory, and far less that of Jesus Christ himself,
(if it can properly be called obedience) is not the duty of Viators, and
therefore utterly impertinent to our purpose. We do not say, that Adam’s
obedience was penal, it being his duty: but Christ’s was, seeing no law
required such obedience of him, who was God; nor was it necessary even to his
human nature, in order to life for himself: for the hypostatic union fully
removed that necessity, and either made him, as to himself, in respect of his
human nature, a Comprehensor, or in the nearest capacity to it, even when he
was subjecting himself to the obedience of a Viator, for us, and as standing in
our room.
But he
says, the Scriptures themselves nowhere ascribe
this satisfaction to Christ’s active obedience; but still to his passive. And
here he cites many passages of Scripture, to no purpose, seeing none of these
give any hint of the exclusion of his active obedience; but rather do include
it; or else he may as well say, that all Christ’s active obedience was no way
necessary, or requisite, unto the work of Redemption; because these passages do
not expressly say so; and yet this he will not say, seeing he grants that his
obedience was an essential requisite, and absolutely necessary, to the
constitution of
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him our Priest, and his sacrifice propitiatory: But we
read of his being made under the law, to redeem these, that were under the
law, Galatians 4: 4, 5, and of his righteousness and obedience, as
necessary to our righteousness and justification, and as having a no less
direct influence into the same; than Adam’s offense and disobedience had unto
our death and damnation, Romans 5: 17, 18, 19.